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According to Richard Rorty, in contemporary philosophy and
humanistic studies a split has occurred between two lines of
thought: the Hegelian lignée, still dominant and represented by De-
contructionism and Hermeneutics, both stemming from Hegel’s
Phenomenology of the Spirit; and the Kantian lignée, which pre-
serves an epistemologic approach and is represented by Linguistic
Analysis and scientific thought (Rorty 1982).
A disciple of Jean Hyppolite, an outstanding Hegel scholar,
Jacques Derrida has combined his Hegelian descent with Heideg-
ger’s radical rejection of metaphysics. He has enjoyed success first
in Europe and then in the United States, starting with his famous
lecture in 1966 at the Johns Hopkins University, where he was
accompanied by Jean Hyppolite, Jacques Lacan, Paul de Man.
From the States his fame boomeranged back to Europe, and has
lasted for thirty years.
Building on the void left by the subsiding of what Ricoeur cal-
led “the school of suspicion” (Nietzsche, Freud, Marx), Decon-
structionism has expanded from Derrida’s own thought, covering
both “strong” and “weak” textualism, represented respectively by
Richard Rorty’s pragmatism and the Yale critics (De Man,
Hartman, Hillis Miller and Harold Bloom). It involved Lyotard,
who has followed his own route to postmodernism, while Gadamer
has turned Hegel’s philosophy of history into a Wirkungs-
geschichte and produced his own Hermeneutics.
Derrida’s Deconstructionism is based on two assumptions:
Kant’s trascendentalism definitely severed empirical science from
non-empirical philosophy; after Heidegger the separation of the
two cultures was, moreover, followed by the death of philosophy
itself, brought about by the definitive end of metaphysics. As no
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truth or revelation is left for philosophy to discover, what remains
is only the philosophical tradition. From such a tradition it is
nevertheless necessary to take one’s distance, but without being
able to go beyond it – as in Hegel’s dialectics, suppressing a thesis
and its opposite through synthesis (Überwindung) – or to deviate
from it – as in Heidegger’s Verwindung, a term meaning a trans-
forming passage or “recovering from”, or a “distortion-deviation”.
Within the circle of language and tradition, both philosophical and
literary, the only task left is then the deconstructing of tradition
itself. The rejection of commitment to either Überwindung or Ver-
windung brings about a game between the two, in a sort of double
bind. The grands récits of the past have been swept away, as Lyo-
tard pointed out, and the success of Deconstructionism “excluded”
the Kantian line, represented by Putnam or Strawson.
From its own specific point of view, the so-called “Weak
Thought”, shared by Vattimo, Rovatti, Eco, confirmed this line,
which, via Heidegger, has at the same time developed and annihi-
lated Hegel’s dialectic historicism.
In its antimetaphysical sway, Deconstructionism criticised struc-
turalism, exposing its inner contradictions and curbing the success
of French semiotics. But the Russian school of semiotics, which
was different from the start, both in its aims and method, has
survived, and Michail Bakhtin’s “philosophy of language” has
today achieved worldwide success. His dialogism fitted into the
frame of the dominant currents of contemporary thought and the
postmodern outlook: its plurality and relativism have met with
wide acceptance and merged with the main trend.
Yuri Lotman’s “philosophy of culture” has in its turn met with
favour: but recognition of his work has not yet coincided with
actual widespread critical practice, or with a debate about and
development of his complex theories on the dynamism and pheno-
menology of culture. In its most engaging aspects it has virtually
remained unexplored.
With Bakhtin Lotman shares several traits: both started their
studies at Petersburg University, read German philosophy and re-
acted to Hegelism, Russian formalism and to Saussurean lingui-
stics, living through the turmoils of contemporary Russian history.
As Bakhtin died in 1975, and Lotman (27 years his junior) died in
1993, a continuation of what had become, in spite of their dif-
ferences, a common line, was left to Lotman. His work responded
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to, built upon and included Bakhtin’s heritage, while at the same
time reaching a more complex perspective.
Lotman’s background included both science and a philosophy:
he derived his concept of the semiosphere from the Russian bio-
logist Vernadsky1 and, while avoiding direct philosophical debate,
he criticized Hegel and has discussed Kant, whose complete work
he read in German, and in whose line of descent he belongs.
After a structuralist start, he denounced the limits of Jakobson’s
structuralism, from which he differed defining his own original
theory of culture by surprisingly joining two terms which had pre-
viously been considered antithetic: historical semiotics. The defini-
tion suggests his unusual bridging position: if Lotman’s scientific
allegiances and his semiotics, characterized by a double depen-
dance from both a priori principles and experience, can lead back
to Kant, his typical and unique blend of diachrony and synchrony
seems to account for historical dynamism. Lotman’s theory of cul-
ture can even provide, as I argue later, its own semiotic explana-
tion of postmodernism.
A debate on Lotman’s theories could therefore help to solve the
opposition between the two philosophical descents in contem-
porary thought – Hegelian and Kantian – as well as between the
scientific and humanistic cultures. Paradoxically, to its own detri-
ment, the theoretical search of knowledge on itself has split at pre-
cisely the time science is obtaining results quicker than ever,
suggesting new paradigms and new epistemological horizons.
A Code Typology
In the context of Lotman’s theory of culture, his model of the
Enlightenment stands central. It refers to a period in which he
specialized in Russian literature under the influence of French
Enlightenment and Rousseau and it played a fundamental role in
the genesis of his theory of culture. He did not derive it by
choosing one or more key aspects from the vast production of the
age: its birth was instead tied to his intuition of a general “law of
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Tagliagambe 1997.
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semiotics” underlying the enormous variety of cultural produc-
tions.
The empirical verification of a convergence of its outcome with
recent historical-philosophical studies is striking and increasing, as
the debate on the Enlightenment proceeds. It therefore poses a
double problem of great interest, related to the nature of such an
important phase or type of western culture and to its role in Lot-
man’s code type theory and its possible impact.
In a 24-page essay in the Italian translation (the piece has still to
be translated into English or French) Lotman identifies in Russian
(and in European) culture four basic types of codes, the infinite
combinations of which are usually hierarchically organized and
originate a manifold variety of texts. This essay, included in 1970
in Stat’i po tipologii kul’tury: materialy k kursu teorii literatury
(Essays on the Typology of Culture: materials for the course of
Theory of Literature), was briefly summarized in an article in The
Times Literary Supplement of October 12, 1973. The same year it
was translated into Italian (Lotman 1973). The essay marked a
turning point in Lotman’s studies during 1970, as Ann Shukman
pointed out in her 1977 volume Literature and Semiotics:
The year 1970 was in many ways the end of a stage [...] the begin-
ning of a new trend, the turn towards the theoretical discussion of
culture as a whole, and the attempt to define cultural universals in se-
miotic terms; from this period Lotman’s theory of literature became
part of his theory of culture (Shukman 1977:1).
Yet, according to Ann Shukman, its roots went back to a 1967
essay, The problem of a Typology of Culture, translated into
French in the same year, and then into Italian in 1969. Here Lot-
man distinguished two opposing types of culture built on different
dominant codes, based on different relationships with the sign: one
was the symbolic Medieval type, the other the Enlightenment one.
The essence of the latter was expressed in Gogol’s rejection of “the
horrible reign of words in the place of facts”, an attitude also mir-
rored in Tolstoy’s story Kholstomer and which leads back to
Rousseau’s philosophy.
The attempt to define Enlightenment culture was indeed the
starting point for Lotman’s formulation of the four dominant codes
of culture, later developed and described in Lotman 1973. And this
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model, deriving from years of study, can directly relate to or vir-
tually combine with all of the author’s subsequent work.
Lotman nevertheless left the pieces of his typology of culture
separate, as each essay stands autonomous. He did not provide a
general theoretical system: even if the 1970/1973 essay could be
seen forming the cornerstone to the typology (or phenomenology)
of culture it had started, Lotman did not unify his theoretical
production, interrupted by his death in 1993. In his final years, in
particular, many of his essays partly overlap in their theoretical
scope and in their perceptive insight into relevant and far reaching
problems, suggesting his attempt to outline a mode of thinking
which would be open to later exploration and development.
The range of Lotman’s essays is fundamentally complementary:
when he speaks of the intersection of different “languages” in the
culture of the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment or the Romantic
period, such “languages”, not further specified but evidently inten-
ded as distinct communicative models, would be more specifically
defined and become more meaningful if referred to the four basic
types of codes and their combinations. His spatial typological mo-
dels (for which he makes reference to his own code theory) and his
description of the dynamics of cultures and of the centre/periphery
exchanges, would acquire a more effective sense if it were con-
nected with the workings of code combinations. These could better
explain the transactions among cultural entities in that border or
“contact area” in which, according to Lotman, renewal and inven-
tion are produced: a view that is today confirmed in scientific re-
search, from quantistic physics to biology, from immunology to the
neuro-sciences, with their shared emphasis on the contact areas,
where evolutionary adaptations occur and qualities of objects can
be defined or known (see Tagliagambe 1997).
The importance of dynamic connections in contact areas emerg-
ing today was indeed anticipated in Lotman’s thought, in his
redefinition of communication as a variable intersection, but this
variable intersection can acquire a tangible meaning if related to
his code type theory. Before moving to such a wide range of
problems as those suggested, the first task which can be faced here
is to test the theory at its beginning: in the definition of the En-
lightenment type code.
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Nature/Reason
Lotman’s four fundamental code types originate from a dual ba-
sis. Synchronically speaking, Lotman identifies the two elementary
relationships of the sign in its binary opposition: with what “it
stands for”, representing its symbolic, referential function; and
with other signs, in its syntagmatic or synctactic connections. The-
se two relations had already been studied in formal logic.
The syntagmatic relation marked Rudolf Carnap’s Wien neopo-
sitivistic phase: in 1934, in his The Logical Syntax of Language,
Carnap delved into the problem of the syntactic control of scien-
tific sign relations. The symbolic or referential function stood
instead at the centre of his American period, under the influence of
Charles Morris, in Meaning and Necessity (1947), where he analy-
sed the relation between sign and object.
After choosing these two synchronic logic relationships, Lot-
man proceeds by considering their four basic possible combina-
tions, as they can both be present or absent or, in turn, present in
the absence of the other.
Then, diachronically speaking, the four types of code produced
as combinations of the symbolic and syntagmatic relations of the
sign appear as empirically and historically present and actually
dominant in four cultural periods: the Middle Ages, Renaissance,
Enlightenment and Romanticism.
The symbolic or semantic (referential) code type seems in fact
to dominate and “explain” Medieval culture, in which the histo-
rical world is supposed to reflect God’s eternal structure and Provi-
dence. This ensures both social stability and cohesion, a precise
collocation for every member of society, the more so as social
roles and positions are maintained on an hereditary basis. The
individual receives his meaning and worth from his place in the
general order, rather than from his personal qualities: his biological
attributes or needs are ignored, but his symbolic function makes
him a part of society, the equivalent of totality. From this view-
point, Lotman asserts, the part is not inferior but equivalent to the
whole. This ensures protection for every state, be it the lowest
servant’s in the social pyramid, but it prevents change and forbids
the new, imposes static repetition and imitation of the exempla in a
culture oriented towards the past. Only what has existed from
ancient times can actually exist and be acknowledged.
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The syntagmatic code instead permeated Renaissance culture.
The unit, the part, is now inferior to the whole and can be sacri-
ficed to it and its efficiency. The concrete, pragmatic aspects of life
that were sacrificed by Medieval symbolism, are vindicated. Ef-
fectiveness is of utmost value. Reference, the guarantee of sym-
bolic meaning, can yield to the advantages of appearance or even
deception: Machiavelli’s The Prince may teach the prince how to
dissimulate, while rhetoric and trompe-l’oeil effects are extolled.
This code allows space for individual enterprise and innovation (be
this scientific or geographical), in favour of the social and global
structure. Political and territorial centralization are favoured, as the
town becomes the centre of social life, and mechanical invention
develops: it’s the advent of the machine.
The negation of the fundamental types of code so far outlined
(both symbolic and syntagmatic) becomes the dominant trait of the
third type code, coinciding with Enlightenment culture. This pro-
vides a “double liberation” from past culture. By negating both
principles of semiosis, this code would indeed lead to utter silence,
to the very effacement of culture, but it rather tends to restrict its
asyntagmatic, asemantic and aparadigmatic (anti-hierarchical)
traits to a criticism of the two previously dominating codes and
“creates the signs” of this double negation, as Lotman puts it (Lot-
man 1973:59).
The loss of meaning and the fragmentation of reality that were
produced, were to trigger off the re-evaluation of the two semiotic
principles denied, the combination of which in a semantic-syn-
tagmatic code becomes the basis of the Romantic culture. After the
nineteenth century – Lotman hints – the code typical of the En-
lightenment and that typical of Romanticism both hold the stage,
combining together: Lotman’s analysis stops short at the beginning
of the twentieth century.
With its “asyntotic” double negation of the symbolic and syn-
tagmatic functions, the Enlightenment type code produces two
main effects: various degrees of desemiotization, brought about by
its double semiotic negation; and the effacement of history, or
rejection of its artificiality, in favour of the only residual reality
left, nature, which is turned into the core value.
The distance between the signifier and the signified is denoun-
ced to the point of actual opposition to signs, which are perceived
as artificial, not real: bread, water, life, love are essential and real,
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not money, uniforms, grades or reputations, illusory and deceptive
symbols. Besides, “singularity” is positive, while being a part, a
fraction of a large totality, is now negative, it does not increase but
decrease value.
The opposition natural/unnatural stands central to Enlighten-
ment culture, Lotman insists, and turns social structures into the
artificial constrictions of a false civilization. The individual’s an-
thropological qualities, life as a biological process and its basic
needs are real, while the modern world of words and signs, re-
jected for instance by Gogol, implies the realm of lies. If for the
symbolic, Medieval imagination “in the beginning was the Word”,
for Enlightenment culture the word is rather a disvalue. Lotman
quotes Rousseau profusely: as the inspirator of Tolstoy’s Khol-
stomer, in which a horse looks with critical desemiotizing eyes
upon the human world of property, social roles and conventions; or
directly, in his description of the child, who has still to learn about
the artificiality of verbal language. He indeed uses the only natural
language common to all men:
On a longtemps cherché‚ s’il y avait une langue naturelle et
commune à tous les hommes: sans doute il y en a une et c’est celle
que les enfants parlent avant de savoir parler. (Quoted in Lotman
1973:56).
This language is based on mimicry and intonation:
L’accent est l’âme du discours [...] L’accent ment moins que la
parole. (Ibidem).
In Rousseau’s outlook the sharing of the syntagmatic ties of
social life in a state does not increase individual freedom or di-
gnity. In fact, the larger the state, the smaller the citizen’s freedom
or strength of representation: Lotman quotes the famous Contrat
social passage in which Rousseau argues that it is better to be a
citizen in a state of 10.000 people rather than in one of 100.000, as
the individual’s portion of suffrage power and influence on law-
making decreases tenfold in the second case: “plus l’état s’agran-
dit, plus la liberté diminue” (quoted in Lotman 1973:57).
In a syntagmatic culture or code, Lotman remarks, one typically
appreciates the impact of the majority as conferring superior power
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to the individual, while the opposite attitude, detracting value from
social dependence, is a clear sign of an Enlightenment type code,
as in the case of Robinson Crusoe on his desert island. Man’s hap-
piness becomes therefore the sole proper aim of social doctrine.
And the members of a crowd or a people are attractive not as a
compact mass, but as a sum of single, equal, weak and subjected
individuals, who need liberating.
The double attack that the Enlightenment code bears on the
symbolic and syntagmatic structure of the state, leaving nature as
the only important principle to test society, brings the natural
man’s viewpoint to the fore, or even suggests to embrace an ani-
mal’s outlook, as in the case of Tolstoy’s horse in Kholstomer, so
close, in this aspect, to Swift’s horses in Gulliver’s Travels. It is
the appraisal of nature that fosters the rewriting of the social con-
tract as well as the égalité-liberté-fraternité formula of French
Revolution. And yet desemiotization, which is the main innovative
tool of the Enlightenment code, comes to a paradox just regarding
nature, its original founding value.
The historical world, where man actually lives, is seen as false,
while the real entity, nature, is from the point of view of ex-
perience as ungraspable and indefinite as the natural condition,
which escapes determination. “Real reality” becomes baffling and
the debate as to the nature of nature becomes endless or grows fan-
tastic, as in Voltaire’s Eldorado or in Swift’s Houyhnhnmland. Op-
posed to signs, nature has indeed become a second degree sign:
such is the meaning of its heuristic value discussed by Rousseau.
But the Enlightenment type code, which dominates eighteenth-
century culture, plays a particular critical function: it makes an in-
surgence at each critical moment of social change and devaluation
of current social structures. If the four basic code types are “avail-
able” or “possible” at any historical moment, employable when ne-
cessary, the aparadigmatic-asyntagmatic type that fostered the
French Revolution tends to appear whenever radical innovation is
necessary. It is to be found, Lotman remarks, in the times of chan-
ge, as from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, and from the Re-
naissance to the Enlightenment proper, which developed when the
code became dominant. The code in question works as a renewing
mechanism, complicating or “outphasing” the interplay and degree
of code combinations.
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Each of the four code types outlined by Lotman actually hides
more than a paradox, and none can claim a right to hegemony. But
the Enlightenment type, the most vigorous semiotic device of
change, and probably the most characteristic code of Western civi-
lization, perhaps implies the highest number of paradoxes. Lot-
man’s model both exposes and explains at least four of them,
previously undetected as such, but actual sources of controversy.
Besides the one concerning “the nature of nature”, already pointed
out by Lotman, at least three more emerge from his model of the
Enlightenment and will now be discussed.
The first is in fact immanent in desemiotization, the basic tool
of the code. This enables the eighteenth century to produce on the
one hand a deep skepticism and the most scathing criticism, and on
the other a celebration of renewal and of the rebuilding quality of
reason, which Kant defines in his first Critique.
Yet in his description of the Enlightenment, Lotman surpri-
singly never mentions reason and certainly this is not incidental.
Indeed this term has caused controversial discussion as to the
definition and evaluation of Enlightenment and concerning the
actual philosophers and thinkers who can coherently represent its
thought. It directly brings us to our main point: a comparison be-
tween Lotman’s model and previous extant models.
Adorno’s Dialectic
After Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialektik der Aufklärung
(1947), the problem of reason and its function would seem in-
escapable in any discussion concernig the Enlightenment. Lot-
man’s avoidance of the word reason is therefore particularly con-
spicuous.
In the Enlightenment culture Adorno sees not so much a
specific moment of historical change, but a phase in the developing
self, the bourgeois traits of which he considers as already at work
in Homer’s Odyssey. The progress of this development increases
during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment proper, only to shift
its centre, after the French Revolution, to German philosophy and
culture. Here it culminates in Hitler’s Nazism and then produces
the alienated destiny of contemporary mass society, as best evident
in America.
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Its very cause and source are seen in the pressing problem of
survival, which has imposed the alternative of either succumbing
to nature or dominating it. The choice of dominion has developed
bringing about both a denial of nature and the subjection of the
weaker and the majority, with the aim of achieving an increasing
control. But the logic of dominion soon backfired on the domi-
nators themselves, in the shape of coercive self-dominion. En-
lightenment then becomes a “dialectic” between a progressive
attempt at dominating nature and a corresponding social regression
in terms of growing coertion. Self-preservation has thus brought
about totalitarianism through a double device: economic and
scientific organization.
The “mathematic spirit”, the very core of reason, finds its cli-
max in Enlightenment culture, which according to Adorno equates
Positivism. It reduces thought to a mathematical apparatus, and
denies value to abstract activities, like art and thought as such: this
is, Adorno argues, what Ulysses’ attitude to the singing Sirens in
the XXII canto of the Odyssey already envisaged.
Ulysses decides to hear the Sirens’ irresistable chant, but has
himself tied to the mast of his ship in order not to yield to it, while
his companions go on rowing indifferently, as their ears have been
stopped with wax. In Ulysses’ impotence to act Adorno sees a pre-
figuration of bourgeois art, which, like nature, must be denied in
order to keep the control and self-control necessary for survival.
This denial for Adorno is the basic core of Enlightenment, seen as
a transhistorical will of dominion or reason (Verstand), characte-
ristic of Western culture and responsible for its dismaying outcome
in the last century: the horror of the concentration camps and the
“waste land” of a generalized distribution of means and goods, pa-
rallel to the growing social insignificance of subdued masses.
Adorno’s description, a political overall judgement of our civi-
lization, does not offer a proper specific interpretation of the
eighteenth century culture. It places Kant side by side with Sade
and Nietzsche and considers them as all part of a coherent pro-
gram, ultimately leading to Nazi pogroms and the contemporary
“equalization” that levels culture.
If compared to Ernst Cassirer’s 1932 study, The Philosophy of
the Enlightenment (later discussed here), the Adornian 1947 theory
of the Enlightenment can actually appear as an astonishing rever-
sal. And Lotman’s later model, emphasizing the primacy of nature
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and the desemiotizing critical attitude towards history, seems, in its
turn, to invert Adorno’s Enlightenment, as based on the primacy of
a degenerating reason perverting history. Contrasts are indeed dis-
concerting.
The way to Adorno’s negative view had been paved by Hegel’s
philosophy of history. Hegel’s discussion of the Enlightenment (or
rather Aufklärung) in the Phenomenology of the Spirit is indeed
ambiguous. On the one hand, it represents the culmination of the
spirit’s progress since Antigone’s times, which caused “the descent
of heaven on earth”, wiping out superstition and the trascendence
separating self from self. But at the same time the experience of
Terror marks the failure of the Enlightenment to liberate the self
and poses the problem of the moral state, to a degree jeopardizing
Hegel’s conclusion of his Phenomenology, as pointed out by Jean
Hyppolite (Hyppolite 1972:396-399).
Under the pressure of recent historical horror, Adorno’s out-
look, like Hegel’s, goes back to Greek civilization, to denounce a
sovrahistorical structural constant pervading centuries of western
culture, an increasing “bourgeois rationalistic dominion” culmina-
ting in Nazi terror. And he calls this constant Enlightenment.
But how has such a position been produced? Again it was Hegel
who furnished two relevant premises for Adorno’s attitude: the
effacement of nature in the Enlightenment culture and the depre-
ciation of Newton’s science.
Hegel’s Deletions and Cassirer’s Return
In Hegel’s description of the Enlightenment in vol. II/VI of the
Phenomenology it is not difficult to recognize the equivalent of
Lotman’s desemiotization in what is called the “language of dis-
gregation” (Zerrissenheit), typical of the period and expressed in
Diderot’s Le niveau de Rameau. This is defined as an inversion –
in terms of detached wit and brilliant irony – of the self’s values.
But just as Hegel examines the rebellion implied in this Zerrissen-
heit, he finds a concept he cannot but recognize and immediately
discards as inappropriate to his system of values: nature as opposed
to history.
No individual, not even Diogenes, he argues, can really leave
the world, while the single self as such is “the negative”. Rebellion
THE ENLIGHTENMENT CODE IN YURI LOTMAN’S THEORY…
Slavica tergestina 7 (1999)
17
must be considered only from the viewpoint of “universal indi-
viduality”: this “cannot” revert to nature, abandon the civilized
well-educated consciousness reached through the long historical
progress he had described starting from the Greek “polis”. There,
in Antigone’s rebellion to Creontes, he had detected the clash be-
tween natural blood bonds and history, marking the end of the
“beautiful unity” of an undivided self. It simply could not be that
the historical development reached in the eighteenth century
should lead the self back to what he calls “the wildness of an
animal-like consciousness, be it ever called nature or innocence”
(Hegel II/IV:87).
Thus Hegel dismisses the uncomfortable concept of a return to
nature, which he discovered in the Enlightenment, by dissolving
the concept of nature along lines which were closely followed by
his disciples. What prevents him from recognizing the importance
of the concept he found, is his refusal to renounce the progressive
development of his historical dialectics. This excluded the possi-
bility to revert to a primitive stage (nature) and allowed no free al-
ternative: an attitude Lotman denounces in one of his essays. In
Historical Laws and the Structure of the Text (in Lotman 1990)
Lotman opposes Hegel’s secular escatology and historical process
to his own interpretation of history as an open experiment. This
view is certainly closer to that of the French revolutionaries, who
rejected the old year numeration to start history anew from year 1
after the revolution, and even changed the names of the months,
recurring to seasonal natural aspects, to emphasize total renewal.
But Hegel’s blindness to the role of nature in the Enlightenment
was made even more relevant by his parallel refusal of another
fundamental aspect of the Enlightenment, which was in its turn
connected to nature.
In 1986, in an authoritative article entitled Povertà dell’il-
luminismo (Shallowness of the Enlightenment), a renowned Italian
expert of the Enlightenment, Paolo Casini (Casini 1986), pointed
to Hegel’s disregard, starting from 1801, for Newton’s theory of
gravitation, described as “born from an illegitimate relation be-
tween physics and mathematics”. Newton had mistakenly assumed
certain concepts of reason as natural laws and had admitted the
irrational element of experience into a science like astronomy, that
was to be founded a priori on dialectic thought. Newton’s method
was a negative example of how experiments can lead nowhere and
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yield no knowledge: “wie überhaupt gar nichts zu erkennen ist”
(Hegel 1971:232; quoted in Casini 1986).
Hegel’s attitude produced, Casini remarks, a double outcome in
his philosophical descent: while up to Hegel the history of the
scientific revolution had been included in the history of philo-
sophy, after him physics, astronomy and mechanics were excluded.
The relation between scientific method or discovery and Enlighten-
ment thought – that was so vital to the Neokantian Ernst Cassirer
in his The Philosophy of the Enlightenment – was erased. This left
Enlightenment arguments and debate, including Kant’s distinction
between phenomenon and noumenon, in a gnoseological void,
caused by the impoverishment of the proper background. Hence
the cliché of the “shallowness of the Enlightenment”, which Casini
decidedly retorts on Hegelism.
It is therefore no chance that Cassirer’s 1932 study of En-
lightenment had to wait until the 50’s for a translation into English,
and even longer to receive a better, albeit belated recognition as a
fundamental contribution, at a time when Hegel’s prejudices, and
those of his descent, start dying down. From the point of view of
Lotman’s model it offers amply documented proof of the validity
of its two central points, desemiotization and opposition between
nature and history. Lotman had indeed most probably read
Cassirer, but what is relevant, in any case, is that Lotman reaches
an analogous outlook by a totally different procedure, in the field
of his own historical semiotics. This convergence appears to be a
reciprocal testing and validation on the concepts in question: while
the rich historical factuality brought about by Cassirer “fulfils” the
expectations of Lotman’s model, this seems in its turn to solve or
“justify” some of the apparently contradictory aspects in Cassirer’s
exposition.2
These refer to the two scientific methods – Descartes’ and
Newton’s – and the relative “genealogies” active in the eighteenth
century, which Cassirer at times sharply distinguishes and at times
melts into an undifferentiated continuum, a problem connected
with that of the list of the philosophers worth considering, men-
tioned in the Preface.
                                                
2 Herbert Dieckman discusses specific limitations and shortcomings in Cas-
sirer’s work, which are not relevant in the present discussion (Dieckman
1979).
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Stressing that “the real philosophy of the Enlightenment is not
simply the sum total of what its leading thinkers – Voltaire and
Montesquieu, Hume or Condillac, D’Alembert or Diderot, Wolff
or Lambert – thought or taught”, Cassirer leaves out both Rousseau
and Kant (Cassirer 1951:ix). Yet the latter – who is actually often
quoted in the essay, although no specific part of the book is
devoted to him – had already been the subject of a volume by
Cassirer and, according to Dieckman, Cassirer’s description of the
Enlightenment actually refers to Kant as its culmination (Dieck-
man 1979:24). As for Rousseau, he is likewise present throughout
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Yet the problem remains
that both names are not included in the Preface. Here this is re-
levant, as Lotman mainly exemplifies his model with Rousseau,
his presence being so pervasive in Russian culture and literature.
Two Reasons
By quoting at the start of his first chapter, D’Alembert’s Essay
on the Elements of Philosophy, Cassirer establishes the premises
on which he bases the intellectual turmoil of the eighteenth cen-
tury. The new analytic spirit nourishing “the century of philosophy
par excellence”, challenging the old tutelage of established tradi-
tion and superseding the theological control of knowledge as well
as political absolutism, stands at the core of the new nature-orien-
ted science. And science has drawn attention to nature as the sole
source of knowledge against the pretenses of Revelation: “Newton
finished what Kepler and Galileo had begun” (ibidem, 9). D’Alem-
bert has no hesitation as to the origin of the new “lively fermen-
tation of minds”, the “enthusiasm which accompanies discoveries”
characteristic of his age:
Natural science from day to day accumulates new riches [...] The true
system of the world has been recognized, developed and perfected
[...] In short, from the earth to Saturn, from the history of the heavens
to that of insects, natural philosophy has been revolutionized; and
nearly all other fields of knowledge have assumed new forms (ibi-
dem, 3).
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But, Cassirer points out, it is of no little importance that
D’Alembert’s philosophical method
involves recourse to Newton’s “Rules of philosophying” rather than
to Descartes’ Discourse on Method, with the result that philosophy
presently takes an entirely new direction. For Newton’s method is not
that of pure deduction, but that of analysis (ibidem, 7).
Newton’s method is indeed the reverse of Descartes’: it does
not begin, as in Descartes’ systematic deduction, by setting certain
principles, general concepts and axioms from which the particular
and the factual can be derived by proof and inference,through a
rigorous chain, no link of which can be removed. The eighteenth
century abandons this “scientific genealogy”, this kind of deduc-
tion and of proof: “it no longer vies with Descartes and
Malebranche, with Leibniz and Spinoza for the prize of systematic
rigour and completeness” (ibidem). It rather starts from empirical
data – nature – proceeding not from concepts and axioms to
phenomena, but viceversa: observation produces the datum of
science to be analyzed, principles and laws are the object of the in-
vestigation, obtained through reduction. The methodogical pattern
of Newton’s physics triumphs in the middle of the century:
However much individual thinkers and schools differ in their results,
they agree in this epistemological premise. Voltaire’s Treatise on
Metaphysics, D’Alembert’s Preliminary Discourse and Kant’s In-
quiry concerning the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality all
concur on this point (ibidem, 12).
The first assumption of the epistemology here implied is the
independence of the original truth of nature, of the “realm of na-
ture” as opposed to the “realm of grace”: nature has become the
horizon of knowledge, and the comprehension of reality requires
no other aid than the natural forces of knowledge. In the self-
sufficiency of both nature and intellect lies the premise for Kant’s
famous definition of the Enlightenment as “man’s exodus from his
self-incurred tutelage” (Kant 1968:XI:51).
Cassirer’s distinctions are here clear and sharp, as his emphasis
on nature and on the two concepts that can be immediately con-
nected with the scientific method: that of reason and that of
system. From them indeed, as Cassirer laments, so many misun-
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derstandings have originated, leading to “a customary consi-
deration of the philosophy of nature of the eighteenth century as a
turn toward mechanism and materialism”. This has actually often
been taken as the basic trend of the French spirit (Cassirer 1951:
55).
Concerning the concept of system confusion must be avoided:
The value of system, the ésprit systématique, is neither underesti-
mated nor neglected; but it is sharply distinguished from the love of
system for its own sake, the ésprit de système. The whole theory of
knowledge of the eighteenth century strives to confirm this di-
stinction. D’Alembert in his “Preliminary Discourse” to the French
Encyclopaedia makes this distinction the central point of his ar-
gument, and Condillac in his Treatise on Systems gives it explicit
form and justification (ibidem, 8).
Fontanelle’s mechanical universe described as “clockwork” in
his Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds is gradually super-
seded and then abandoned as the epistemologists of modern phy-
sics win the field, and Condillac in his Treatise on Systems bani-
shes the “spirit of systems” from physics: the physicist must not
explain the mechanism of the universe, but establish definite gene-
ral relations in nature. While for Descartes geometry was the ma-
ster of physics, the physical body being extension (res extensa) and
this had entangled him in difficulties, Newton no longer believed it
possible to reduce physics to geometry and recurred instead to ma-
thematics. His analysis indeed implied no absolute end or closed
geometries, but remained open, producing only relative provisional
stopping points (ibidem, 51). This difference from the great se-
venteenth century systems – which in Lotman’s terms we could
define as based on a dominant syntagmatic type code – is stressed
by Cassirer, as he points out that
materialism as it appears in Holbach’s System of Nature and
Lamettrie’s Man a Machine (L’homme machine), is an isolated
phenomenon of no characteristic significance. Both works represent
special cases and exemplify a retrogression into that dogmatic mode
of thinking which the leading scientific minds of the eighteenth
century oppose and endeavor to eliminate. The scientific sentiments
of the Encyclopaedists are not represented by Holbach and Lamettrie,
but by D’Alembert: and in the latter we find the vehement renun-
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ciation of mechanism and materialism as the ultimate principle for
the explanation of things, as the ostensible solution of the riddles of
the universe. D’Alembert never deviates from the Newtonian method
(ibidem, 55).
The real meaning of the word reason used by eighteenth century
thinkers now becomes apparent, as do the misconceptions it has
raised. An expression indicating the power of the mind,
“reason” becomes the unifying and central point of this century,
expressing all that it longs and strives for, and all that it achieves. But
the historian of the eighteenth century would be guilty of error and
hasty judgment if he were satisfied with this characterization and
thought it a safe point of departure. [...] We can scarsely use this
word any longer without being conscious of its history; and time and
again we see how great a change of meaning the term has undergone.
This circumstance constantly reminds us how little meaning the term
“reason” and “rationalism” still retain, even in the sense of purely
historical characteristics (ibidem, 5-6).
As compared with the seventeenth century usage, the concept of
reason in the eighteenth century undergoes an evident change of
meaning:
In the great metaphysical systems of that century – those of Descartes
and Malebranche, of Spinoza and Leibniz – reason is the realm of the
“eternal verities”, of those truths held in common by the human and
the divine mind. What we know through reason, we therefore behold
“in God” (ibidem, 13).
This “centralized” unitarian (“syntagmatic”) reason of eternal
verities is superseded by an analytical reason, taken in “a different
and more modest sense”, “no longer the sum total of innate ideas
[...] a sound body of knowledge, principles and truths, but a kind of
energy, fully comprehensible only in its agency and effects”. This
energy, Cassirer remarks, dissolves data through analysis, as it
does with “any evidence of revelation, tradition and authority”,
from Voltaire to Hume (ibidem): that is, it “desemiotizes” through
nature.
It is now evident that Cassirer’s study confirms or rather “va-
lidates” both Lotman’s primacy of nature and principle of desemio-
tization as the basic tenets of the Enlightenment culture. But it also
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delegitimates the very word reason which Lotman avoids as
useless or misleading: the seventeenth century has its own (syntag-
matic) reason, while the eighteenth (asyntagmatic) century has a
different one. Here are to be found the historical premises of Lot-
man’s semiotics, according to which every code type has its codi-
fying principle or “reason”.
More evidence in favour of the two characteristics selected in
Lotman’s model of the Enlightenment type code could be derived
also from the vast range of recent historical reassessments, from
Franco Venturi’s analyses to Reinhart Kosellek’s studies.3 But the
convergences shown seem already to qualify Lotman’s “simple”
model and its “elementary” logic for serious consideration within
contemporary reflection on culture and its production.
Explications
Although clear in his fundamental distinctions, now and then
Cassirer seems to hesitate when, for instance, he considers how
Newton completes Galileo’s search, or how, apart from emphasis
on method, he detects a steady development of the new ideal of
knowledge spreading with no real chasm since the previous
century (Cassirer 1951:22). While these remarks may seem
contradictory to Cassirer’s own thesis of the innovation characte-
ristic in the eighteenth century, Lotman’s theory of the code types
can easily account for them.
Anticipations of the Enlightenment code, such as Galileo’s, are
pointed out by Lotman in the passage from the Middle Ages to the
Renaissance and then from the Renaissance to the new epoch: this
can explain what appear as cases of “continuity” within a frame of
contrasting dominant codes in different periods. On the other hand,
as Lotman points out, different phases of code dominance can
coexist or overlap, and combinations of codes are the rule, since a
text, and even more so a culture, is formed by a hierarchy of codes.
As to Cassirer’s (not unusual) difficulty in enlisting Kant or
Rousseau side by side with the Encyclopaedians, while at the same
time frequently referring to them, this again can be explained, in
                                                
3 See in particular, among the two authors’ many works, Venturi 1970 and
Kosellek 1959.
Giuseppina Restivo
Slavica tergestina 7 (1999)
24
Lotman’s terms, as due to their composite texture. Rousseau’s vo-
lonté general seems to reflect a code semiotically different (a
syntagmatic one) from the one informing Rousseau’s own domi-
nant “desemiotizing” nature, which does not prevent him from
showing some of the most articulated and typical aspects of the
asyntagmatic Enlightenment type code. Similarly, Kant can well
embrace a compound of codes, the Enlightenment one already
mixed with a relevant secondary Romantic component. Neither
chronology nor authorship can garantee the unitarian composition
of a cultural text. This is indeed as variable as any organic indivi-
dual adaptation to life. Only an immanent principle, capable of
describing the possible outcomes of culture such as Lotman’s, can
help distinguish, classify, evaluate the cultural syntax of texts.
This springs from code combinations, the variety of which is
practically infinite, considering the different weight of each com-
ponent in its incidence on the final overall result. A comparison
with the combinations of the four bases of human DNA, giving
rise to the infinite diversity of individuals and, at the same time, to
the precise identification of each individual, comes easily to mind.
Moreover, Lotman’s model can explain an apparently con-
tradictory aspect of Enlightenment culture: the presence of a uto-
pian attitude, fostering new social contracts and innovation, along-
side a skeptical disruptive attitude (what Hegel calls Zerrissenheit),
which may verge on the absurd. Lotman points out the two
different outcomes of the Enlightenment code as produced by its
intimate nature (Lotman 1969).
Swift’s Gullivers Travels and Johnson’s Rasselas well exempli-
fy the double outcome that the two principles of the Enlightenment
– the (heuristic) value of nature and desemiotization – can produce.
In his description of an imaginary race of “noble horses”, fol-
lowing the example of More’s and Bacon’s imaginary utopias,
Swift depicts an ideal world representing a positive natural con-
dition. Johnsons’ protagonist, Rasselas, instead, fails in his search
for a positive “choice of life” in the actual world because of the
disappointing results offered by his socio-anthropological obser-
vation or rather desemiotization. In the first case, the supposed
“memory” of the heuristic image of natural positiveness is in-
tended as an educational tool, simulated in the protagonist’s
supposed experience in the ideal world; in the second case, as
nature cannot but be experienced in history, natural positiveness
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becomes ungraspable and this paradox prevents Rasselas from
making a choice, leading him to the verge of the absurd.
Lotman’s code theory can, on the other hand, even help
interpret Adorno’s attitude in its contrast with Cassirer’s almost
completely inverted picture of the Enlightenment.
Thinking in terms of an Hegelian historical continuum, Adorno
merges the specific type of Enlightenment culture in the subse-
quent (and also preceding) forms of culture, pointing to a transhi-
storical syntagmatism in order to explain the traumatic outcomes
of contemporary history. At the same time he personally assumes a
radically asyntagmatic attitude, denouncing the “artificial domi-
nion” on nature: in Lotman’s terms, he pursues an Enlightenment
type code. Such a code, in its absurdist outcome, informs his “ne-
gative dialectic”; while on the other hand Cassirer points to the
renewing-utopistic aspect of the Enlightenment, with which his
personal outlook seems to coincide or “intersect”.
As Cassirer laments, inversion in the evaluation of the En-
lightenment was not unusual, and we can now have a cue to such
contrasts. Cassirer himself belongs – with Dilthey (1901), Fueter
(1911), Meinecke (1936) – to the first wave of scholars who
started a reassessment of the Enlightenment against the Romantic
bias.
In spite of an enhancement of the influence of the Adorno-
Horkheimer outlook, produced by the 1968 crisis, more recent
historical and philosophical research confirms a “renewed reading”
of the Enlightenment; and Lotman’s theories can be considered to
stand in this trend. At the same time, though, they can suggest why
the contemporary tendency to include all aspects of the culture of
the eighteenth century, with no distinguishing principle, has
weakened the term Enlightenment itself, making it appear more
and more elusive.
The attempt to avoid the (Kantian/scientific) principle of simpli-
fication, in order to embrace all the occurring manifestations, in an
(Hegelian/historical) “completeness”, necessarily prevents an un-
derstanding of the workings underlying the surface appearance of
phenomena.
Recently, in studies on the Enlightenment, a large variety of
research methods have been applied, from nouvelle critique to
statistical analysis, from the Annales tradition to Foucault’s inver-
sion of official values and opposition/emargination, the latter ha-
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ving become the protagonist of the century. Against this back-
ground, contemporary to Deconstructionism, Cassirer’s Philosophy
of the Enlightenment was at first eclipsed as abstract speculation,
but is now newly emerging, as the Hegelian dominant recedes.
Adding new emphasis to the scientific debate of the eighteenth
century, siding against the old “spirit of system” in favour of
hypothetical probabilistic procedures, Casini has recently pointed
out Cassirer’s Philosophy of the Enlightenment as a valid reference
on the historical, scientific, epistemological and aesthetic turn of
the period (Casini 1994:12). And new attention has recently been
paid to the central importance of nature in eighteenth century eco-
nomic and juridical doctrines, in physiocracy and in jusnaturalism.
These again confirm Lotman’s theory, in the light of which they
are at the same time better understandable. In its unique stress on
nature as agriculture, physiocracy reveals itself as a typical mani-
festation of the Enlightenment.
In François Quesnay’s Tableau Economique only agriculture
produces wealth and is considered a positive investment, while
commercial and industrial activities are seen as unproductive: from
Mirabeau’s L’ami de l’homme (1760) and Philosophie rurale
(1766) to de la Rivière’s L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés
politiques (1767), the primacy of nature and of agriculture stands
at the basis of a physiological self-maintaining natural balance in
economics, and represents the first formulation of the laissez-faire
principle. Though rejecting the unproductivity of non agricultural
activities, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1766) was the critical
heir to Quesnay’s theories.
Jusnaturalism in its turn leads to different outcomes in En-
lightenment culture, but they all share the stress on nature as their
founding principle, as well as its positiveness. This is evident in
Locke’s juridical value of the state of nature, as in Rousseau’s
sauvage, deprived of social links and juridical traits, or in Kant’s
provisory natural right, forming the basis for social private right.
At the same time nature as an originary condition of man is, like
reason, a variable redefined in every dominant code: while for the
Enlightenment it has a positive heuristic value, in previous out-
looks it sometimes appeared very differently. According to the
jusnaturalistic outlook of Hobbes’ Leviathan, natural equality me-
ant total war and led to the alienation of individual rights: these
were renounced to establish a monarch’s absolute power, which
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ensured peace through subjection. Here a syntagmatic outlook
favoured centralized control, while the eighteenth century reversed
the negative quality of the natural condition, preferring it to histo-
rical organization. For Rousseau in particular war is not primary,
but is rather the outcome of civilization: original natural freedom
and equality are lost when society comes into existence.
From the standpoint of Lotman’s model the actual texts – be
they literary or not – appear, as already emphasized, usually based
on a combination of different codes, one of them being a dominant
one: a text is therefore plural, but mostly organized according to a
hierarchic order. After Romanticism, though, the equal forces of
the two latter code types – the Enlightenment and the romantic
ones – seem to produce “half and half” combinations: a kind of
dialogue on an even basis. Pushing this development further, we
could see contemporary postmodernism as the outcome of the lack
of a dominant code, or as the simultaneous presence of all types,
none being hegemonic.
An Epistemology of Intersection?
Lotman’s theories can appear, as they did to Julia Kristeva in
her 1994 essay in PMLA, as culturally “subversive” (Kristeva
1994:375). The metaphor of the fall of the Berlin wall, used by
Kristeva to stress the impact of Lotman’s dynamic historical se-
miotics on the static philological attitude of classic structuralism,
can still be valid today. A semiotic study, no longer of the text it-
self, but of its sociology as well, has not yet been tried, although as
early as in 1977 Fokkema and Kunne-Ibsch defined in this sense
Lotman’s theories as a potential “Copernican revolution” in huma-
nistic studies (quoted in Sörensen 1987:309). Ten years later Dolf
Sörensen analysed Lotman’s thought in his Theory Formation and
the Study of Literature (Sörensen 1987:281-319) as capable of a
far-reaching renewal in textual interpretation: which must be based
on both micro- and macro-analysis, a “completeness” for the sake
of which Sörensen even suggested a fusion of Lotman’s theories
(more open to macro-analysis) with those (more inclined to micro-
analysis) of Algirdas Greimas.
As an hermeneutic tool, Lotman’s model allows for utmost
“comprehensiveness”, as it offers a possibility to recognize the
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composite nature of semiosis, in cultures as in texts, and to map
their hierarchical organization. At the same time it does not sacri-
fice an overall understanding and theoretical explanation of the
diversified data compounding a text or producing a cultural out-
look, as well as a dialogue of cultures.
What is striking about Lotman’s theory is its double move to-
wards simplification and complication in the constitution of a text.
A model of only four code types explains the basic characteristics
of four historical periods, from the MiddleAges to Romanticism.
Surprisingly, the general logical assets of these different periods
are made to stand forth cogently, as Lotman’s essay shows,
through a procedure typical of simplifying and non-reductive
scientific generalization.
At the same time each text appears composite, and its interpre-
tation more complex. This now consists in the encounter of virtual-
ly contrasting sets of code combinations, both the set that gave rise
to the text and the set belonging to the reader or listener. An
enormous gap opens on the hermeneutic front, since the probability
of total coincidence between the two sets is low: this offers a
semiotic justification for the infinite openness of interpretation. In-
terpretation becomes in fact a form of partial intersection, or rather
the series of possible intersections.
If to the plurality of each text and its readings we add Lotman’s
dynamic view of the text described in O semiosfere (Lotman 1984)
– a work deeply influenced by biologist Ivan Vernadsky – we
begin to appreciate a double profound affinity. On the one hand,
with the general principles of Bakhtin’s dialogism, which are in
Lotman transposed from the domain of genre to the domain of
semantics and of its dynamics. On the other hand, with the play of
interference, counteraction and combination, typical of the new
scientific paradigm common today to physics as well as artificial
intelligence, biology, immunology, or the neurosciences.
It has been observed in fact (see Tagliagambe 1997) that the
quantum theory, Gödel’s and Church-Turing’s theorems, have all
brought to an end the idea of objects as independent from the
observer, as separable, localized and representable. Traditional
epistemology, extending from Leibniz to Frege and Hilbert, which
even Einstein still tried to defend in 19484, is no longer viable
                                                
4 In a letter to Born, dated April 5, 1948 (Einstein - Born 1973:201).
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today. Scientific research suggests a different outlook: reality is not
“representable” but “explicable” through models. Object confi-
gurations can be described from the border area separating/con-
necting them with the outside, as it is in this area that relations
with the observer and with the ambience are reciprocally de-
termined and can be known. Vernadsky’s concept of co-evolution,
of “biosphere” (based on the interaction of organisms and
ambience) and “noosphere” (based on the interaction of human
culture and ambience) stand at the same time at the source of
Lotman’s models and concept of “semiosphere”, as at the root of
the contemporary scientific outlook. Conceptual convergence is
not therefore casual: Lotman’s intersectionism and its implied
“epistemology of contact” can appear as the semiotic equivalent of
the new epistemologic paradigm emerging in the fields of science.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Paolo Casini,
1986 Povertà dell’illuminismo, “Intersezioni”, 1986:2
(Agosto).
1994 Scienza, utopia e progresso. Profilo dell’illumi-
nismo, Bari 1994.
Cassirer, E.
1951 The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton
1951 [Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, Tübingen
1932].
Dieckman, H.
1979 Illuminismo e rococò, Bologna 1979; (see Cassi-
rer interprete del Settecento [An Interpretation of
the 18th Century, “Modern Language Quarterly”,
1954:15]).
Enstein - Born
1973 Scienza e vita. Lettere 1916-1955, Torino 1973.
Hegel, F.
1971 Vorlesungen, in: Werke, Frankfurt a.M. 1971.
Giuseppina Restivo
Slavica tergestina 7 (1999)
30
Hyppolite, J.
1972 Genesi e struttura della Fenomenologia dello Spi-
rito di Hegel, Firenze 1972; [Genèse et structure
de la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel, 1946].
Kant, I.
1968 Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,
[1784], in: Werke, XI, Frankfurt a.M. 1968:51-61.
Kosellek, R.
1959 Kritik und Krise. Ein Beitrag zur Pathogene der
Bürgerlichen Welt, Freiburg und München 1959.
Kristeva, J.
1994 On Yuri Lotman, “PMLA”, 3.5.1994.
Lotman, Ju. M. (Лотман, Ю.М.)
1973 Il problema del segno e del sistema segnico nella
tipologia della cultura russa prima del XX secolo,
in: Ricerche semiotiche. Nuove tendenze delle
scienze umane nell’Urss, Torino 1973:40-63.
1969 О метаязыке типологических описаний куль-
туры, „Учёные записки Тартуского гос. ун-
та”, 1969:236:460-477 [Труды по знаковым си-
стемам, IV].
1984 О семиосфере, „Учёные записки Тартуского
гос. ун-та”, 1984:641:5-23 [Труды по знаковым
системам, XVII].
1990 Universe of the Mind. A Semiotic Theory of Cul-
ture, London - New York 1990.
Rorty, R.
1982 Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis 1982.
Shukman, A.
1977 Literature and Semiotics. A Study of the Writings
of Yu. M. Lotman, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford
1977.
Sörensen, D.
1987 Theory Formation and the Study of Literature,
Amsterdam 1987.
THE ENLIGHTENMENT CODE IN YURI LOTMAN’S THEORY…
Slavica tergestina 7 (1999)
31
Tagliagambe, S.
1997 Epistemologia del confine, Milano 1997.
Venturi, F.
1970 Utopia e riforma nell’illuminismo, Torino 1970.
